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6
Property Rights and the 




I seek here to connect two prominent contemporary concerns—
property rights and environmental sustainability. While the relation 
between these two ideas may not be apparent at first thought, they are 
most certainly linked in the realm of public policy. The linkage oc-
curs because many actions taken by private landowners hold serious 
implications for parts of the natural world that are the subject of much 
concern for sustainability. And to the extent that public policies con-
cerning sustainability seek to influence individual and group action so 
that detrimental impacts are avoided, individual landowners may find 
themselves in an unwelcome situation. The dominant myth in America 
is that the owner of land may do as she wishes with the land that she 
owns. When this belief is acted upon, and when such acts are detrimen-
tal to sustainability outcomes, perceptions of property rights come into 
direct conflict with the imperatives of sustainability. 
In this chapter I will offer a brief overview of the concept of rights 
(and that of duties), I will explore the concept of property, and I will 
then spell out the idea and practice of property rights in the American 
political and legal system. I will next turn to a brief discussion of the 
issues that must be faced if we are to understand the essence of sustain-
ability. The problem to be highlighted here is that sustainability cannot 
be discussed in the absence of serious thought about the evolving pur-
poses of nature. That is, we learn about what is worth sustaining when 
we learn about how different people come to see what “nature is for.” 
Since the purposes of nature are continually evolving, we can only un-
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derstand concerns for sustainability if we understand the nature of this 
evolutionary process. Finally, I will offer some insights into the prob-
lems that arise when scientific experts (or courts of law) offer up advice 
(or legal findings) about sustainability or about property rights. The 
philosophy of pragmatism helps us to understand that, in a democracy, 
assertions from scientists—or decrees from courts—must be justified to 
those who will be affected by those assertions and decrees. I explore the 
important implications of having public policy flow from this fact.
PROPERTY RIGHTS
If we are to understand the role of property rights in relation to 
concerns for environmental sustainability, we must start with the idea 
of a right. Rights are the collective (legal) permission to be able to 
compel the government to come to your assistance in particular situ-
ations (Becker 1977; Bromley 1989, 1991; Christman 1994). Rights 
do not offer mere passive support by the state. Rather, to have rights 
is to have assurance of active assistance from the coercive power of 
the state. That is, the state stands ready to be enlisted in the cause of 
those to whom it has granted rights. Rights expand the capacities of the 
individual by indicating what one can do with the aid of the collective 
power. This process works because of the correlated duties on others 
who might wish to interfere with the individual to whom rights have 
been granted. Rights are not something embedded in natural law. In-
stead, rights emerge through the collective recognition of the legitimacy 
of particular interests in the eyes of the state. 
With the meaning of rights in hand, we can now consider the mean-
ing of property. Despite how we talk—“I just bought a nice piece of 
property on a lake”—what the idea and practice of property convey 
is not an object (such as land). Property is, instead, a stream of values 
into the future (Macpherson 1973, 1978). When one buys a piece of 
land one acquires not merely a physical object but rather control over 
a benefit stream arising from the setting and circumstances associated 
with that object. That is why we spend money (one benefit stream) in 
order to acquire property (“ownership” of a new benefit stream arising 
from the fact of ownership). The price paid to acquire that new benefit 
stream is simply the discounted present value of all future net income 
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flowing from ownership of the thing and its stream of values. Owner-
ship concerns futurity—value running into the future that the owner 
controls (for the most part) and may now receive. 
The idea of property rights brings these two ideas together. Prop-
erty rights define the limits of the law pertaining to the income aris-
ing from the control of income-producing settings and circumstances. 
Trademarks, copyrights, and patents are property rights. All are forms 
of rights in property (the future value) and correlated duties falling on 
nonowners. In practical terms, the empirical content of property rights 
is determined when conflicting rights claims are brought before that 
legal body created to resolve conflicting claims in a democracy—the 
courts. As property rights disputes work their way through the court 
system, some of them may end up in the Supreme Court. The legal 
struggle, and the appeals process that keeps it moving up through ever 
higher layers in the judicial system, is precisely concerned with figuring 
out which disputant has the more compelling rights claim. We see that 
property rights are not some a priori concept by intuition (“this is a ta-
ble”). Rather, property rights are the result of a process whose essential 
purpose is to determine which of the conflicting rights claims before the 
court seems better, at the moment, to sanctify. In other words, settings 
and circumstances are not protected because they are, a priori, instan-
tiations of property rights. Rather, those settings and circumstances that 
gain protection from the courts acquire, by virtue of the decisions in the 
courts, the status of a property right.
John Locke plays a central role in the American idea of property 
rights. Locke worked out a theory of the acquisition of property, such 
acquisition then giving rise to several desirable outcomes, from which 
flow the main justifications for the holding of property. Locke’s neces-
sary starting point is a creation story in which a Calvinist God gives 
the earth to humans in common and admonishes them to take dominion 
over that commons by, among other things, mixing their labor with it 
(Kreuckeberg 1999). Locke is then able to argue that by having mixed 
their labor with the land they deserve to become its owner. This Lock-
ean creation story occurs in a state of nature (a pre-civil society) and 
hence it is necessary to have some means of protecting that which has 
been acquired. It is here that the state enters the picture. To Locke, the 
purpose of the state is to protect those who have labored as God com-
manded, and thereby to bestow on all the beneficial effects that arise 
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from this class of hard-working citizens. The state, having formed to 
protect those who have, out of nothing but hard work, created so much, 
is thus obligated to stand as a shield for those who now hold property. 
That protection works in two important directions. It works against oth-
ers who may wish to prey on the industry of those who labor on their 
land, and it works, reflexively, against that very state. That is, the state 
itself is restrained, by the collective realization of the great benefit aris-
ing from the existence of an owning and laboring class, from interfering 
with those activities it finds so beneficial and compelling.
It is here that we come to the Lockean idea of holding land. If one 
acquires land in the Lockean way then it has been justly acquired, and 
its continued holding is justified on moral grounds. Equally important, 
this holding is justified on prudential grounds since the effect of indi-
viduals holding land is the production of benefits for the community at 
large. The key justification for the continued holding of land finds its 
expression in the idea that this grant is the essential assurance of liberty 
for those who hold land. They are assured of liberty because the state 
agrees to protect them from the predations of others, and they are as-
sured of liberty because the state itself agrees to refrain from its own 
form of predation on the private property of its citizens (unless compen-
sation is offered in return). 
Locke recognized that as the earth filled up, and as less and less of 
God’s Commons (to use Kreuckeberg’s phrase) was available for ap-
propriation, it was inevitable that conflicts would arise (Kreuckeberg 
1999). As Locke put the matter, his theory of justified acquisition and 
subsequent justified holding worked only so long as there was “enough 
and as good” for others. This Lockean proviso brings us to Immanuel 
Kant. The views of Kant are important in discussions of sustainability 
because it was Kant who first offered a way out of the trap set by the 
static nature of Locke’s concept of property rights. 
Kant’s innovation was to recognize that rights (and therefore prop-
erty rights) are not tangible empirical realities but are, instead, mental 
constructs. The word he used is noumena. Those things that cannot be 
apprehended by the senses but are knowable only by reason constitute 
noumena. Kant motivates his inquiry on rights by asking what condi-
tions are necessary for an individual to make internal something that 
is, by its very nature, external? Something external to an individual is 
made internal by understanding the idea of belonging to. And how is 
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it decided that something external belongs to an individual? The indi-
vidual may declare that some particular object or situation belongs to 
her. Notice that this is a claim against all others to whom the object or 
situation might otherwise belong. Such claims are asserted by those 
who wish to make the point that the speaker is the rightful (justified) 
possessor and controller (“owner”) of the thing under discussion. The 
speaker is making something internal that is, quite clearly, external.
Kant recognized that such claims represent negations of the inter-
ests of others within the same community. And he suggested that while 
one individual may indeed announce and display physical possession 
of something external, this was not the same as having a socially sanc-
tioned authority to make that declaration binding on others who might 
wish to make internal that very same thing. That is, unilateral declara-
tions of “belonging to” are inherently unstable and therefore cannot 
be expected to settle the matter once and for all. Kant noticed that it is 
only from the consent of others that one can make internal that which is 
clearly external. For if that external thing can belong to anyone within 
the community, what justification can be mounted to assert that it be-
longs to any particular member of that community? Why should others 
willingly accept binding duties on nothing more compelling than the 
self-serving assertions of those already in possession of something of 
potential value to others? 
Kant said that such assertions are nothing but the affirmation of 
empirical possession. And by being based on mere possession they con-
fuse physical control with something much more profound. That more 
profound circumstance is one that Kant called intelligible possession. 
Intelligible possession comes into play when a community of sentient 
beings reaches agreement that indeed it is both right (moral) and good 
(prudential) that someone among them should be able to make internal 
something that has hitherto been external. The essence of empirical pos-
session is a dog with a bone. There is not, nor can there be, recognition 
among the community of dogs—all of whom covet the bone—that it 
“belongs to” the one currently in possession of the bone. The most one 
can say is that they acknowledge possession. It takes Kantian reason to 
transcend empirical possession. In human society, what is mine depends 
not on what I say about it being mine. Rather, what is mine becomes 
mine by virtue of the assertions of all others who, by their declaration, 
acquiesce in their own disenfranchisement from the benefits associated 
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with that object or circumstance. Others grant me possessio noumenon, 
or socially justified possession—I cannot take it for myself.
 We see that Locke gave us a basis for justified acquisition and hold-
ing of land (property) as long as there is “enough and as good” for 
others. But Locke stopped short of a complete theory of what is to be 
done when there is not enough and as good for others. That is, Locke 
developed a theory of acquisition and holding that works best when 
it is needed least. Kant helped us to see that the continued holding of 
land in the face of scarcity requires something very special. For scar-
city raises the specter of deprivation and exclusion if Lockean acquisi-
tion and holding works against the interests of others in the community 
who—by virtue of coming late—find that all of God’s Commons has 
already been justly acquired. How are we to justify the continued hold-
ing of land once there is no more of it to be justly acquired? Or what are 
we do about those who hold (own) land yet insist on using it in ways 
inimical to environmental sustainability?
Contemporary Lockeans have a ready answer to this question: let 
the latecomers buy it from those who have justly acquired it (who have 
previously purchased it). Or, if the current owner is to be restrained 
from using land in destructive ways the government must offer com-
pensation in order to induce the owner to stop such practices. Notice 
that once the initial acquisition has been transferred to another for a 
particular price, the logic seems compelling and without end—all fu-
ture acquisitions must be mediated by due consideration to the extant 
holder of land (property). And what is transferred in this way is—and 
must be—precisely what earlier acquirers obtained. By this logic, the 
“just acquisition and holding” continues into perpetuity.
Such logic threatens the prospects for sustainability of certain com-
ponents of nature adversely affected by traditional land-use practices. 
That is, the current holding of land and other natural resources often 
results in actions that are now found to be neither moral nor prudential. 
What if ownership results in wetlands—important breeding and nest-
ing habitat for wildlife—being destroyed? What if ownership results 
in too much old growth timber being cut down? What if ownership 
means excessive soil erosion that fouls streams and lakes? Given these 
possibilities, on what grounds can payment then be justified in order to 
induce the current holder to stop using his land in an antisocial manner? 
In other words, what is to preclude one or more holders of land from en-
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gaging in social extortion? We see that land justly acquired may evolve 
into land unjustly held, its current use no longer being moral or pruden-
tial. Kant recognized that the community itself must determine whether 
land justly acquired continues to be justly held. And Kant located this 
determination in acts of reason undertaken by a civil society (Williams 
1977). It is the community itself that must set the standards by which 
holding of justly acquired land remains justified.
Kant forced us to work out a new theory of holding land in the face 
of emerging collective disapproval of the actions of the current owner. 
Such a theory must offer an explanation (justification) for difficult deci-
sions about what to do with just and prudential holdings into the future. 
In more practical terms, this theory must address the issue of what is 
to be done when current land holdings—or particular uses of land—are 
no longer socially acceptable. Must payment to the offensive owner 
always be forthcoming? This is the essential “takings” question in land-
use regulations (Bromley 1993, 1997). 
One school of thought holds that there are no circumstances in which 
actions on land that has been justly acquired can be circumscribed or 
precluded—say through regulations—without those restrictions being 
accompanied by compensation (Epstein 1985). In reality, however, 
there are many land-use conflicts in the American experience in which 
particular uses of land have been prohibited and no compensation has 
been forthcoming. One classic case is Penn Central Transportation Co. 
v. City of New York, in which the Penn Central wanted to construct an 
enormous skyscraper on stilts above New York’s Grand Central Termi-
nal, which it owns. The New York City Landmarks Commission had 
declared it a historic site, preventing this plan. Penn Central sued the 
City of New York for compensation under the takings clause and was 
denied. Other cases involve wetland drainage and timber harvests under 
the Endangered Species Act. The courts have sometimes found in the 
interests of a restrained land owner, and they have sometimes found in 
favor of governments seeking to protect natural habitats in the interest 
of sustainability. Why have the courts varied?
An answer to this apparent contradiction is found in the work of 
Charles Sanders Peirce, said to be one of the most creative and profound 
philosophers America has ever produced. Peirce would have us imagine 
the idea of property rights in the American experience as the benedic-
tion applied to those settings and circumstances that, when the dust of 
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consideration by various levels of jurisprudence has finally settled, are 
found worthy of indemnification by the state (Peirce 1934). Notice that 
the term property rights is not something known axiomatically—some-
thing whose essence is clear to us by intuition or introspection before a 
particular legal struggle is joined and its specifics emerge. Rather, the 
idea of property rights is worked out—created—in the process of re-
solving mutually exclusive rights claims before the courts. This means 
that the American judicial system does not seek to discover where the 
a priori property right lies. Instead, the courts offer a necessary forum 
to which, from time to time, conflicting rights claims will be brought. 
When the more compelling rights claim has been determined, the court 
will issue a decree to that effect. We see that property rights are made, 
not discovered.
This idea that the courts create, not discover, property rights as they 
dig into conflicting rights claims can be attributed to the celebrated Su-
preme Court justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. Louis Menand says that 
“it was Holmes’s genius as a philosopher to see that the law has no 
essential aspect” (Menand 2001). Indeed, Holmes had written in 1870 
that the merit of common law is that it leads judges to decisions on the 
merits of the cases before them and it then allows them to determine the 
guiding principle secondarily. Menand describes the process thus: 
A case comes to court as a unique fact situation. It immediately 
enters a kind of vortex of discursive imperatives. There is the im-
perative to find the just result in this particular case. There is the 
imperative to find the result that will be consistent with the results 
reached in analogous cases in the past. There is the imperative to 
find the result that, generalized across many similar cases, will be 
most beneficial to society as a whole—the result that will send the 
most useful behavioral message. There are also, though less explic-
itly acknowledged, the desire to secure the outcome most conge-
nial to the judge’s own politics; the desire to use the case to bend 
legal doctrine so that it will conform better with changes in social 
standards and conditions; and the desire to punish the wicked and 
excuse the good, and to redistribute costs from parties who can’t 
afford them (like accident victims) to parties who can (like manu-
facturers and insurance companies).
 Hovering over this whole unpredictable weather pattern—all of 
which is already in motion, as it were, before the particular case 
at hand ever arises—is a single meta-imperative. This is the im-
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perative not to let it appear as though any one of these lesser im-
peratives has decided the case at the blatant expense of the others. 
A result that seems just intuitively but is admittedly incompatible 
with legal precedent is taboo; so is a result that is formally consis-
tent with precedent but appears unjust on its face (Menand 2001, p. 
339). 
It would seem that pragmatism is a central reality of American juris-
prudence. This pragmatism is particularly suited to property rights cas-
es, which are concerned with figuring out where the most compelling 
property interests lie. The problem here is to blend moral and prudential 
arguments in search of the best thing to do. That best thing will com-
prise the “truth” in that particular setting. In fact, one way to paraphrase 
the courts’ approach is to say that truth is merely that which it is better, 
at the moment, to believe. Truth is the special benediction we bestow on 
our settled deliberations (Rorty 1982, 1999).
It would also seem that conventional efforts to divine the idea—
the a priori essence—of property rights are flawed and prevent clear 
thought about environmental policy and sustainability. When property 
disputes arrive in the courts, justices are forced to consider and imagine 
possible futures and then figure out which of the claimants has the more 
compelling claim in light of those imagined futures. Their legal find-
ings, or decrees, reflect this new recognition.
SUSTAINABILITY
With this necessary background on the legal side of land-use is-
sues, let us turn directly to the matter of sustainability. The central issue 
concerning environmental sustainability is to recognize that individual 
and collective ideas concerning the purposes of nature are undergo-
ing constant change. Thus the problem of sustainability concerns the 
need to understand and to come to grips with the continual evolution 
in human conceptions about what nature is for. And the present-day 
challenge of sustainability involves the ongoing evolutionary process 
whereby a particular type of land cover—a particular plant and animal 
community—has come to be seen as much more complex, interesting, 
and dependent on other distant ecotypes (as well as much more impor-
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tant to the well-being of other ecotypes and to us as humans) than had 
been previously thought.
At one level, not much about the forest has changed in a fundamen-
tal way over the past several decades. Despite dwindling in the area 
they cover worldwide, forests are still an evolving complex of chemical 
and physical properties and attributes. However, while the forest has 
not changed very much, the precise social meaning of the forest has 
changed profoundly. It is not the forest on the ground that we address 
and fuss over when we undertake management activities. It is the forest 
in our minds that we are working on and seeking to manage. Indeed it is 
the forest in our minds that we use when we are in it, and it is the forest 
in our minds that we covet and recall when we are away from it. 
Modernism, grounded on Cartesian radical doubt, brought us the 
odd idea that the mind is—to use Richard Rorty’s phrase—simply a 
“mirror of nature.” That is, we are led to believe that there is a unique, 
tangible, and knowable reality out there (in the world) that would be-
come available to us if we would but first, as good Cartesians, purge 
our minds of all existing ideas and thoughts about that reality. With 
this newly emptied receptacle, we could then immediately grasp and 
comprehend that extant reality, and then we would—at last—have an 
accurate and irrefutable description of it (Rorty 1979). Our knowledge 
of it, and about it, would be complete and irrefutable. With that durable 
knowledge in hand, we would then be getting very close indeed to the 
“truth” about that particular reality—the “thing in itself,” as Kant and 
his followers might put it. Some refer to this as the representational 
model of knowing. Those whose essential burden in life is to produce 
true descriptions of and stories about that reality are called scientists. 
And, as modernism drills into us at every opportunity, scientists pursue 
the truth.
Pragmatists are not so sure about this search-for-truth claim. Prag-
matism suggests that when the collective determination of what is out 
there converges into a consensus and comes to be adopted by the epis-
temic community (the scientific discipline) whose task it is to investi-
gate some particular aspect of the world, then this consensus becomes 
the accepted story—the “truth”—about that observed and apprehended 
“reality.” Scientific debates are not about some knowable reality. They 
are debates about stories about that reality. In other words, there is no 
plausible, reliable, complete, irrefutable, comprehensive, true, and ac-
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curate account of a “forest” or an “ecotype” or an “ecosystem.” Indeed, 
that Holy Grail of environmental policy, species, is itself an artificial 
construct. To be sure, the creations of the early classifiers and categoriz-
ers have some plausible attributes. But the only thing that recommends 
them to us now is that these categories and their members serve to or-
der our world—they are useful for the purposes that motivated their 
creation. 
I hope it is now easier to comprehend my earlier assertion that what 
matters about forests, ecotypes, and ecosystems is nothing more than the 
categories, meanings, and purposes that humans attach to them. Each of 
these environmental assets and the species in them become for us what 
we have made of them. We will see, understand, use, manage, and re-
vere them in ways that evolve as we figure out new ways to think about 
them. To put the finishing touches on this line of thought, the forest is 
for us the sum of its effects on us. Human interaction with forests and 
ecosystems can only be understood in terms of the effects those forests 
and ecosystems have on us. We do not manage forests and ecosystems. 
We manage and redefine the effects that forests and ecosystems have on 
us, and we manage and redefine the effects we have on them.
We know and understand a stunning sunset, a high mountain mead-
ow, or the boreal forest, not by anything inherent in those physical set-
tings, but rather by the effects those settings and circumstances have on 
us. Our conception of the effects of a sunset, a forest, or an ecosystem is 
the whole of our conception of a sunset, a forest, or an ecosystem. That 
is all there is (Peirce 1934). The mind is not a mirror of nature. Rather, 
the mind creates our conception of nature in the light of our current 
embeddedness in particular social, economic, and cultural settings and 
circumstances. An adult from an urban area sees a very different forest 
than does an adult from a small town surrounded by forest. She sees 
the forest differently because she learned about it differently, and she 
most certainly uses it differently. When those settings and circumstanc-
es change for us, then the construction project in our mind recreates 
nature in keeping with the emergent futures we think we see before us. 
This recreation of nature is always undertaken in light of our imagined 
purposes for the future.
 The way in which we see nature cannot be distinguished from the 
way in which we imagine the purposes of nature—what nature is for. 
Indeed it is our vision of what nature is for that prefigures how we see 
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and regard nature. Debates about sustainability will, inevitably, bring 
into the discussion the testimony of scientific experts. And the use of 
scientific knowledge for improved decision making necessarily starts 
with the requirement that the scientific knowledge offered up must be 
pertinent to the disparate purposes for nature held by the many indi-
viduals and groups who claim to speak on behalf of nature. There is no 
single decision maker, and this multitude of audiences reminds us that 
there cannot possibly be a single bundle of scientific knowledge that 
will, upon presentation by the experts, be found to be decisive with re-
spect to what shall be done about particular environmental challenges.
In the face of this multitude of audiences for scientific knowledge, 
we must recognize that there are two general categories of knowledge 
that are pertinent. The first concerns scientific knowledge that presumes 
to be informative, while the second concerns information that pertains 
to what we call agency. Consider the problem of global climate change. 
When we think of scientific knowledge that presumes to inform, we 
usually think of the natural sciences—paleobiology, oceanography, cli-
matology, forestry, atmospheric chemistry, and the like. The point here 
is that distinct epistemic communities undertake research to gather data 
that, with sufficient interpretation and elaboration, will provide perti-
nent information about processes of interest to the rest of us. Notice that 
data are not information. Rather, information is purposefully reconfig-
ured data. We will be shown long-run trends in global mean tempera-
tures, we will be shown fossil records and maps of vegetation change. 
We will see photographs and maps and charts. We are being informed. 
Or are we? Some individuals, with different perspectives on the issue, 
and with different interests at stake, may well be suspicious. In other 
words, we must never presume that all individuals are equally open to 
what the rest of us might consider to be useful information. 
Consider now the second category of scientific knowledge—what 
I above referred to as the problem of agency. Regardless of what one 
happens to believe about global climate change, the interesting issue 
is whether or not human activity—say the burning of fossil fuels—is 
plausibly related to this matter. That is, one can accept the natural sci-
entific evidence that, yes, it would seem that the earth is indeed getting 
warmer. But admitting a warming trend and accepting human culpabil-
ity in that trend are two distinct mental processes. Perhaps the trend is 
caused by increased activity on the surface of the sun. Or perhaps Planet 
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Earth is going a bit wobbly on its axis. We see that many individu-
als—again for a purpose that may be subconscious—draw a distinction 
between fate (so-called acts of God) and outcomes in which the hand 
of humans is seen as decisive. For many individuals, corrective action 
to address acts of fate is pointless; they are of the belief that only if hu-
mans can be found culpable must we confront and seek to change those 
implicated behaviors.
Suddenly global climate change, a matter of such overwhelming 
simplicity and certitude in the minds of some individuals, is seen to be 
multilayered and deeply confusing. In addition to this complexity, we 
have multiple audiences, each of which brings its own created imagin-
ing about necessity and purpose and its own particular receptivity to 
what the rest of us regard as informative evidence. 
WHAT TO BELIEVE?
I now turn to the process whereby individuals come to hold particu-
lar beliefs, and how they might be induced to alter firmly held convic-
tions. I shall approach these questions from the perspective of what I 
call volitional pragmatism—the human will in action, looking to the 
future, trying to figure out how that future ought to unfold for us (Brom-
ley 2004, 2005).
The central challenge in public policy for environmental sustainabil-
ity is to understand the process whereby information from a community 
of scientists is regarded as definitive and pertinent to the problem under 
consideration. There are two issues here. The first is the authority with 
which scientists speak on a particular matter. This problem has to do 
with the veracity and coherence of pronouncements emanating from a 
particular community of scientists. The second problem involves the 
receptivity of the larger public to scientific pronouncements and dec-
larations. The first problem concerns what I call warranted assertions; 
the second, what I call valuable assertions. 
Warranted assertions are those that can be justified to most members 
of the discipline out of which the assertions emerge. Most economists 
who advise on environmental policy feel quite comfortable telling us 
how environmental choices ought to be considered—and that is usually 
in terms of benefit-cost analysis. The issue here is the extent to which 
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a subset of the discipline of economics has a conceptual and empirical 
sanction to issue prescriptive assertions, and to have those claims stand 
as the truth as seen through the eyes of the entire profession. 
Pragmatism accords the status of warranted belief (or warranted 
assertion) only to the settled deliberations of an entire community of 
scholars (a discipline or a particular epistemic community). When an 
entire discipline speaks with clear consensus on a particular scientific 
matter, then the rest of us can safely regard these truth claims as con-
stituting warranted assertions. On the other hand, when that disciplin-
ary consensus is absent, or when it begins to dissipate over time, then 
the associated truth claims cannot be justified within the discipline and 
they thereby lose their warrantability and their legitimacy to the larg-
er community to which they are addressed. The various audiences for 
these assertions from “science”—whether executive-branch agencies of 
government, legislative bodies, courts, or citizen’s groups—find them-
selves barraged by a wide array of conceptual and empirical claims. 
Often, the processing of those assertions takes place in a manner that 
might be thought irrational by those who produce scientific assertions. 
Such dismissive judgments are quite unjustified, and this brings us to 
the demand side of information. 
Consider now the idea of valuable assertions. Pragmatists insist 
that the adjective “valuable” can only be applied by those who are the 
intended consumers of particular assertions (truth claims). In other 
words, the consumers of those assertions stand as the definitive judges 
of whether or not they happen to find them valuable, useful, pertinent, 
informative, and dispositive. For instance, when environmental econ-
omists offer specific consequentialist prescriptions about collective 
choice—indicating which decisions are efficient, correct, rational, best, 
and socially preferred—we see truth claims from a particular subdisci-
pline of economics projected onto disparate considerations about what 
is best for the future. The pragmatist would wish to know whether or 
not those specific truth claims can be justified to all members of the par-
ticular community to whom they are directed. If that justification is pos-
sible then the truth claims are valuable. They are valuable because the 
community into which they are projected finds such assertions helpful, 
useful, edifying, and instrumental to improving the working out of what 
seems best to do in the current setting and circumstances. If those truth 
claims cannot be justified to the members of the pertinent community 
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then such claims are unjustified. They are unjustified precisely because 
the community to whom they are directed finds them to be impertinent 
to the task they currently face.  
We see that the prescriptive assertions from a community of dis-
ciplinary adherents are hardly a sufficient condition for the immediate 
acquiescence of the rest of us. The public may well respond, “Do not 
expect the rest of us to stop what we are doing and fall into line with 
the pronouncements from scientists just because they happen to be sci-
entists.” Indeed, the public’s acquiescence in the alleged truth claims 
of science must rest on a separate set of arguments and reasons from 
those to which the members of a discipline alone are privileged. With 
the public lacking this information, disciplinary practitioners are not 
entitled to expect the general population to accept their particular truth 
claims on faith. 
Notice that the issue here is not truth but justified claims or justi-
fied belief. The pragmatist would ask whether economistic truth claims 
are capable of being justified to an audience of individuals who are the 
objects of our interest as we seek to improve their lot with our socially 
preferred, or optimal, policies. The question worth asking is, “Why, ex-
actly, are the truth claims of environmental economics more pertinent to 
this particular choice setting than, say, the truth claims of psychology?” 
We have here a debate about the true and the quest to justify claims 
about the true. Recall that truth is not a property of perfect correspon-
dence between propositions (words) and particular events and objects to 
which those propositions refer—between language and things. Truth is 
not denotative. Truth is, instead, a property of the relationship between 
different statements about specific events and objects—that is, between 
contending linguistic claims. Truth is connotative (Bromley 2005). 
We now have a way to view the prescriptive assertions emanat-
ing from any number of scientific disciplines. Warranted assertions are 
those that can be justified to the larger disciplinary community—here 
the keys are that warranted assertions be coherent in their concept and 
plausible in their empirical claims to the larger epistemic community 
out of which such assertions arise. Valuable assertions are those that 
a community of sapient agents (that is, the rest of us) find useful and 
reasonable to the decision now before them. The essential idea here is 
that human choice and action are properly characterized as prospec-
tive volition—the human will in action, looking to the future, trying 
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to determine how that future ought to unfold. As this process evolves, 
individuals and groups bring contending expressions and imaginings to 
the task of choice and action (Shackle 1961). Individuals and groups 
do not know precisely what they want until they work out what they 
can have. Group action is more complicated than individual action be-
cause it requires reconciliation of disparate and contending individual 
expressions and imaginings until a consensus emerges—the properties 
of which are that this consensus is regarded as 1) feasible, and 2) the 
best thing to do at this particular time. 
The two properties of that consensus—“feasible” and “best at this 
time”—represent judgments reached by those individuals who are re-
sponsible for collective action. In the realm of environmental policy, 
the first step in this process of working out an emergent consensus is 
necessarily confined to legislators, administrators, and judges. As we 
know, this process may be aided by input from economists and other 
scientific “experts.” It is here that the first test of valuable assertion is 
encountered. In a democracy, going beyond this level entails the critical 
step of justifying particular decisions or decrees to the larger politi-
cal community. In some cases that would include polluters, victims of 
pollution, and others who care about nature. In other cases, it could be 
those who see the purpose of the forest being the production of timber 
versus those who see the purpose of the forest being the provision of 
places of solace and emotional regeneration. In either case, these are 
the individuals whose separate actions will be liberated, restrained, or 
expanded by policies that favor one purpose over another. If policies 
are not justified to such disparate audiences, those policies will lack 
legitimacy. This justification to the larger political community neces-
sarily entails the giving of reasons for the decision reached, and those 
reasons must match as closely as possible the asking for reasons that is 
expected from the political community to whom the collective action is 
directed (Brandom 1994, 2000). This activity is properly thought of as 
justification in the service of emergent consent. 
We see that even if particular truth claims are deemed coherent by 
the discipline—or the court chamber or parliament—from which they 
spring, the projection of those truth claims to a larger audience is im-
pertinent unless there is widespread acceptance on the part of those to 
whom the truth claims are directed. Individuals in contemporary life re-
tain the authority to reject, for their own reasons, truth claims from any 
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source (scientist or mystic). Recall that the status of valuable belief is a 
property bestowed upon prescriptive assertions (truth claims) by those 
to whom such claims are directed—not by those who produce the asser-
tions. All that the producers of prescriptive assertions can justifiably af-
firm is that their assertions share wide agreement within the interpretive 
community out of which they arise—that they are warranted. 
We see that the fundamental problem in much public policy is that 
pronouncements from scientists tend to be seen as presumptively legiti-
mate, while the pronouncements from nonscientists are often dismissed 
as mere opinion, as based on emotion, as idealistic, or as predicated on 
sentiment. Such judgments are simply one more residue of modernist 
conceit. 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND SUSTAINABILITY—AGAIN
My purpose here has been to find a way to help us escape the trap 
in which environmental policy (and discussions of sustainability) is 
usually framed. That usual framing forces us to make a choice at two 
levels. At the first level, we must decide if we are to invoke consequen-
tialist choice rules or ethical choice rules. Notice that much debate gets 
stalled here and never moves on to the second, more profound level, 
where substantive issues are addressed. Even assuming that we manage 
to reach agreement on which path to the “correct” choice is to be fol-
lowed, this second-level challenge remains fatally flawed. It is flawed 
because it presumes that there is some a priori right way to address 
either the ethical issues or the consequentialist issues.
This suggests that discussions about sustainability cannot be un-
derstood as prescriptive assertions about what must be—what ought to 
be—saved for the future. Nor can we make much headway by advanc-
ing prescriptive assertions concerning the optimal level of something 
that must be preserved. Rather, coherence in such conversations will 
only flow from a continual conversation—a political process—in which 
we work out what seems worth saving as we struggle with figuring out 
what we revere now and what we hope our descendants will revere as 
well. This conversation addresses fundamental issues about the sustain-
ability side of our story. 
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While such considerations are going on, it is to be expected that 
owners of private land may well experience the unwelcome scrutiny of 
the larger community, which happens to be affected by particular land-
use decisions. In response to this scrutiny landowners may well appeal 
to the community’s understanding of what it means to have a property 
right. They would, it seems, be well advised not to play this card too 
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